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NOTES
SPEAK THE TRUTH AND TELL NO LIES: AN
UPDATE FOR THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH
PROTECTION ACT
I don't know much about polygraphs, and I don't know how accurate
they are, but I do know they scare the hell out of people.
-Richard M. Nixon
I. INTRODUCTION

As a society and as human beings, we are inherently fascinated with
uncovering the unknown, especially when it involves what those around
us are thinking - how they feel about us, what they are planning next,
and most importantly, whether or not they are lying.2 This idea manifests
itself from the esoteric, with a vast number of superheroes 3 and book
characters possessing telepathic powers, to the concrete, with man's
attempt to make this nagging desire a reality in the form of a lie-detector
machine. As one journalist puts it "[t]here is something disconcerting
about the fact that we can map the human genome and land a robot on
Mars, but we still can't 4say for sure whether someone is trying to pull
the wool over our eyes.",
1. Paul D. Seyferth, An Overview of the Employee Polygraph ProtectionAct, 57 J. MO. B.
226, 226 (2001).
2. While the general public seems to disfavor the polygraph and its progeny, it is still
fascinated by such devices. See Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility offMBi Lie Detection: The Cultural
BiasAgainst "Mind Reading" Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1394 (2007).
3. William Marston, one of the early inventors of the polygraph, is the creator of the comic
book character Wonder Woman. Dina Temple-Raston, Foolproof Test for Catching Liars Still
Elusive, NPR (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=15670581. In
the comic, Wonder Woman wielded a magic lasso that had the power to make people tell the truth.
Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2010).
4. Temple-Raston, supra note 3.
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In 1988, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
("EPPA") to restrict the startlingly high use of lie detection devices in
the workplace.' While this law did much to combat the use of these
inaccurate devices, the codified exemptions in the law left many
individuals, namely public sector employees, unprotected. In addition to
these gaps in the legislation, new and increasingly intrusive technology
is being marketed as a lie detection device. These shortcomings and
technological advancements urgently require a change in the EPPA's
statutory framework. The purpose of this Note is to outline the changes
necessary to cure the current weaknesses in the EPPA and bring it up to
date. Section II describes the history of the polygraph itself as well as the
EPPA. Section III outlines the current statutory provisions and the
corresponding regulations of the EPPA and discusses the law's
exemptions in detail. Section IV explores functional magnetic resonance
imaging ("fMRI"), a medical scan similar to an MRI that is being touted
as the newest form of lie detection. Lastly, Section V proposes
amendments and modifications to the EPPA to update the law and
ensure its continued effectiveness.
II. HISTORY OF THE POLYGRAPH AND THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH
PROTECTION ACT

A. The Origin andEvolution of the Polygraph
On July 30, 1925, Leonarde Keeler filed a patent application with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") for his
invention, "Apparatus for Recording Arterial Blood Pressure." 6 In his
specification, Keeler noted that while his invention had medical uses,
this particular set up was also capable of being used in psychological
evaluations, particularly those occurring during criminal investigations
by police.7 The USPTO granted Patent number 1,788,434, to Keeler on
January 13, 1931, distributing, for the first time, rights to a machine
purported to detect lies. 8
While Keeler, a Berkeley, California police officer, is frequently
credited with being the father of the polygraph, he was not the first to

5. Charles P. Cullen, The Specific Incident Exemption of the Employee PolygraphProtection
Act: Deceptively Straightforward,65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 262, 273 (1990).
6. U.S. Patent No. 1,788,434 (filed July 30, 1925).
7. '434 Patent col.2 1. 109-13, col.3 1.17-19.
8. See '434 Patent; Temple-Raston, supranote 3.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss1/7

2

Barnhorn and Pegram: Speak the Truth and Tell No Lies: An Update for the Employee Poly

2011]

SPEAK THE TRUTH AND TELL NO LIES

develop lie-detecting technology. 9 In 1895, Italian psychiatrist and
criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, declared that he could ferret out when
someone was lying simply by monitoring the fluctuations in the person's
blood pressure.1 ° This same concept was put forth in the United States in
the 1910s by Harvard psychologist William Marston. 1" Marston
contended that a person's systolic blood pressure could indicate
deception, rising in a curve if the person was lying during an
examination.12
The modem polygraph still focuses on medically detectable
physiological responses, but has been somewhat updated since the time
of Lombroso, Marston, and Keeler. For example, in 1951, the USPTO
issued Patent number 2,538,125 to John E. Reid for his polygraph,
which differentiated itself from the prior art by adding a gauge of
muscular activity to the commonplace blood pressure, pulse cycle, and
respiration measurements. 13 A typical polygraph machine today includes
a number of medical devices.' 4 The machine first uses a sphygmograph,
a cuff that is placed around the examinee's upper arm, to monitor
changes in blood pressure.' 5 Next, the machine monitors changes in
breathing patterns through pneumograph tubes that are wrapped around
the upper and lower portions of the chest.' 6 Finally, two electrodes are
attached to the index and middle fingers in order to record any changes
in skin perspiration.' 7 The readings from these devices create four
separate graphs, two reflecting respiration, a third showing heartbeat,
pulse rate, and blood pressure, and a fourth indicating increases or
decreases in perspiration.' 8 After the examination period is complete, the
examiner evaluates the print-out from the machine to determine whether
or not the examinee was lying and, if so, in response to which
questions.' 9

9. Temple-Raston, supra note 3.
10. Michael Tiner & Daniel J. O'Grady, Lie Detectors in Employment, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 85, 86 (1988). Lombroso is also known for his contention that criminals could be
distinguished from law-abiding citizens through certain physical characteristics. Id.
11. Temple-Raston, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. U.S. Patent No. 2,538,125 col. 1 1.4-7 (filed Nov. 19, 1945).
14. Tiner & O'Grady, supranote 10, at 85-86 & n.2.
15. Seyferth, supranote 1, at 226.
16. Id. at 227.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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B. PolygraphExamination Techniques

From popular culture depictions of polygraph testing, such as
Robert De Niro's examination of Ben Stiller in Meet the Parents, 20 an
average person may conclude that an examiner simply asks a list of
questions he feels is pertinent to uncovering the truth. In reality,
examiners generally use one of three methods to administer a test: the
relevant/irrelevant ("R/I") test, the control question test, and the
concealed knowledge test. 2' The R/I test, the first test created, 22 was the

most commonly used by private sector employers for pre-employment
screenings before the enactment of the EPPA. 3 During the R/I test, the

examiner asks a variety of questions, both relevant and irrelevant to the
subject at hand.2 4 The theory behind this technique is that a person who
is lying responds differently to relevant questions than to neutral,
unrelated questions, and that this response is picked up physiologically
through the polygraph.25 In the converse, if the examinee is having the
same response to all questions, it is determined he is being truthful2 6

The control question technique, most commonly used in criminal
investigations, builds off of the R/I method, adding various "control"
questions to the mix. 27 The control questions generally touch on a

variety of different situations or topics that most examinees have
encountered within their lifetimes.2 8 Control questions are administered
for a number of reasons; for example, innocuous questions give the
examiner a baseline from which to evaluate responses to relevant
questions. 29 Other control questions investigate the examinee's past in
order to "determine whether the subject shows a pattern of behavior
which indicates he is the type of person who will commit the act in

20. See MEET THE PARENTS (Universal Pictures and Dreamworks LLC 2000).
21. Peter C. Johnson, Comment, Banning the Truth-Finder in Employment: The Employee
PolygraphProtectionAct of 1988, 54 MO. L. REv. 155, 157 (1989).
22. Id.
23. S. REP. No. 100-284, pt. 3, at42 (1988).
24. Id.; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157. An irrelevant question may consist of something as
simple as what the examinee had for lunch that day. Irrelevant questions are usually innocuous and
do not pry deeply into the life or background of the examinee.
25. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
26. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
27. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157. The control question method
builds off the R/I method in that both methods attempt to establish a base by asking certain
questions. However, each test formulates its base with different types of questions. See id. at 15758.
28. S.REP. NO. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
29. S.REP. NO. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
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question (i.e., stealing from an employer)." 3 ° Overall, the examiner
analyzes the test results using a numerical scoring system, comparing
answers to control questions with answers to relevant questions. 31 If an
examinee has stronger responses to relevant questions than to control
questions, it is determined that he is being deceptive.32
The final method, the concealed information technique, is also
known as the guilty knowledge test. 33 During a concealed information
polygraph test, the examiner inserts a number of questions where it is
presumed only someone involved with the specific incident being
investigated would have knowledge of the event or realize the
importance of the questions.34 It is postulated that a person with no
"guilty knowledge" of the incident would respond the same to all
questions, leaving no hiccups on the polygraph chart.35 On the other
hand, a person who was involved in the incident would have a
physiological reaction to the questions, visibly leaving the evidence of
his deception on the print-out.36
C. Problems with the Polygraphand Its Entry into the Legal System
There is very little debate over whether a polygraph's instruments
take accurate readings of an examinee's physiological changes.3 7
However, unearthing which emotional response the recorded
physiological changes reflect is where the problem of a polygraph's
validity and accuracy begins to emerge. A variety of feelings and
psychological states such as fear, anxiety, shame, embarrassment, shock,
anger, and resentment can all show up as identical changes on a
polygraph read-out. 38 A majority of experts disagree with the popular
perception that a polygraph is a lie-detector. They feel that while the
machine can indicate stress in the examinee, both the machine and the
examiner are incapable of stating with certainty what caused that
stress.

39

The process of administering the polygraph examination is one of
30. Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
31. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 42; Johnson, supra note 21, at 157.
32. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 42.
33. Johnson, supra note 21, at 158.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. S. REP. No. 100-284, at41.
38. Id.
39. Id.at 41-42.
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the many problems inherent in the system. Some organizations such as
the American Polygraph Association try to reduce the potential for
inaccuracy in their examinations by having a Code of Ethics. 40 Some
individual polygraph examiners, like former New York Police
Department investigator and polygrapher, Bill Majeski, have their own
personal code of ethics.4 1 Majeski states4 2"I will never do a polygraph test
if a person is in a high state of anxiety.
While some examiners strive to administer ethical examinations,
problems still arise both unintentionally and through significant abuses.
The polygraph examiner can affect the results of the test substantially.4 3
The test administrator's expertise can make a world of difference in six
areas, including "(1) determining the suitability of the subject for testing,
(2) formulating proper test questions, (3) establishing the necessary
rapport with the subject, (4) detecting attempts to mask or create chart
reactions, or other countermeasures, (5) stimulating the subject to react,
and (6) interpreting the charts." 44 One of the most common ways for an
examiner to affect the outcome of the polygraph is by acting overly
intimidating. 45 If an administrator is suspicious of the examinee, he may
engage in overt or covert methods to affect the results, creating a false46
positive. One polygraphist noted his feelings on the subject stating that
47
the polygraph was "'the best confession-getter since the cattle-prod.'
Besides having an overly intimidating demeanor, an examiner can
also affect the scales through the set of questions he uses.48 Questions
can run the gamut from general questions about the examinee's family
and what car he drives, to more invasive questions about sexual
preferences, political beliefs, and intended length of stay at his current
job.49 Prior to the implementation of the EPPA, one examinee discussed
a test he was subjected to with the Labor-Management Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, stating:

40.

See

Am.

Polygraph

Ass'n,

Code

of

Ethics,

Am. POLYGRAPH

ASS'N,

http://www.polygraph.org/section/about-us/code-ethics (last updated Jan. 10, 1999).
41. See Temple-Raston, supra note 3.
42. Id.
43. Kittay, supra note 2, at 1368.
44.

L.J. 895,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1368-69 (citing Paul C. Giannelli, PolygraphEvidence: Post-Daubert,49 HASTINGS

905 (1998)).
Kittay, supra note 2, at 1362.
Id.
S. REP. No. 100-284, pt. 3, at 42 (1988).
See Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 10, at 87-88.
Id.
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And so he asked me also if I liked extramarital sex, and I again told
him this was none of his business. Before he could jump in and
interrupt me and tell me just to answer yes or no, I told him, "Well I
guess I don't have a girlfriend, so I guess I'm not involved in
extramarital sex!" His attitude was a little hostile. And he told me that
50
....
it was up to him whether I was hired or not
Besides for the type of questions asked, it has also been suggested
that the order in which the questions are being asked may affect the test
taker, producing unintended reactions and results. 51
While the behavior of the examiner and the questions he uses can
affect the outcome of the polygraph, other factors outside of the
examiner's control, such as certain characteristics of the examinee, can
affect the exam's results. 52 The examinee's position within the company
53
or agency might even have an effect on the polygraph's results.
Companies and agencies that test their employees with some frequency
tend to find that most senior-level employees have no trouble passing
polygraph examinations.5 4 Lower and entry-level employees, however,
are a different story, with anywhere from 30 to 40% failing the
Many, like University of Minnesota psychologist
examinations.
56
William Iacono, attribute this to a sort of reverse intimidation. To
demonstrate this idea, lanoco uses the example of giving a test to the
director of the CIA, stating "[h]ow would you like to be the examiner
who gave him a test and say he failed? What kind of a career would you
, 57
have?
Before any of the previously mentioned problems and concerns
with the polygraph were thoroughly investigated or studied, individuals
began trying to use results of polygraph examinations in court as bona
fide evidence of the truth. 58 The first appellate court to entertain the use
of a purported lie detection machine was the D.C. Circuit in its landmark
case, Frye v. United States.59 Frye was a man who had initially
50. Id. at 88 (citing Pressure in Today's Workplace: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1980)).
51. Kittay, supra note 2, at 1369.
52.

Id.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results Often in Queston: CIA, FBI
Defend Test's Use in Probes, WASH. POST (May 1, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001006.html.
57. Id.
58. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
59.

Id.; James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-PolygraphAdmissibility after
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confessed to a murder, but then recanted his story, claiming his
innocence.60 In order to prove his original confession disingenuous and
that he was in fact innocent, Frye submitted to a "primitive version" of a
61
polygraph, which measured the fluctuations in his blood pressure.
Frye's counsel first offered to have the examiner testify as an expert
about the results of the test, espousing the defendant's innocence since
Frye had passed the test.62 When this request was denied, the attorney
further offered to conduct a test on the defendant in the presence of the
jury.6 3 This request was also denied. 64 In its review of the district court's
decision, the D.C. Circuit proffered what was to become the general rule
for the admittance of scientific evidence for years to come. The court
recognized that for scientific evidence to be admitted, it "must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. 65 Applying this standard, the court
found that the systolic blood pressure deception test used in Frye's case
had not yet received enough recognition in the scientific community to
66
find acceptance in the legal community. While Frye did not completely
ban the use of deception-detection machines in a courtroom setting, it
acted as a bar for over forty years, continuously being cited as the
authority for the inadmissibility of the polygraph.67
D. The Callfor and Creationofthe Employee PolygraphProtectionAct
1. Prevalance of the Polygraph before the Implementation of the EPPA
Even though the polygraph and its counterparts did not receive the
warmest reception in the courtroom, businesses, agencies, and
organizations, public and private, felt the polygraph could be an
important and useful tool in a number of areas.68 Many businesses and
government agencies came to realize that, even though a polygraph can

Rock and Daubert,1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (1996).
60. Brian R. Gallini, Police "Science" in the InterrogationRoom: Seventy Years of PseudoPsychological InterrogationMethods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 529,
567 (2010).
61. Id.
62. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. McCall, supra note 59, at 368.
68. See Seyferth, supra note 1, at 227.
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be inaccurate in diagnosing whether an employee or potential employee
is lying, "the real utility of the polygraph machine... is that many of the
tens of thousands of people who are subjected to it each year believe that
it works-and thus will frequently admit to things they' 69might not
otherwise acknowledge during an interview or interrogation.
The 1980s saw a large increase in the amount of polygraph tests
administered to employees and applicants. 70 It was estimated in 1984
that somewhere between two hundred thousand and one million
polygraph examinations were administered to job applicants and
employees. 7' Only four years later in 1988, this number had jumped to
an approximate two million examinations annually, 72 with nearly 70% of
those being administered pre-employment.7 3 What may have been the
most disconcerting is that only 15% of the tests administered were used
for the legitimate
purpose of investigating a specific incident in the
74
workplace.

With polygraph use on the rise, many states took initiatives to ban
or curtail its use. By 1988, only seven states had failed to enact some
form of ban or regulation on the use of polygraphs. 75 Twenty-one states,
making up the majority of state polygraph legislation, did not ban the
device, but instead imposed various regulations on both examiners and
the machine itself.76 Ten states prohibited employers from requiring their

employees to submit to a polygraph, but allowed employers to suggest
or request employees submit to a test. 77 Finally, only twelve states and

the District of Columbia banned the polygraph outright, mandating that
an employer could neither require nor suggest his employee undergo an
examination.78
Besides state legislatures, a few state courts also expressed their
disapproval of the rampant use of the polygraph in the workplace. One
such instance was the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Texas State
Employees Union v. Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental

69. Eggen & Vedantam, supra note 56 (emphasis added).
70. See David E. Neely, The Employee PolygraphProtectionAct: Good News for Employees
and Job Applicants, 77 ILL. B.J. 598, 598 (1989).

71. Id.
72. Id.
73.

S. REP.No. 100-284, pt. 3, at46 (1988).

74. Id. The remaining 15% of tests administered were classified as "post-employment
random." Id.
75.

Johnson, supra note 21, at 161.

76. Id.
77.
78.

Id.
S.REP. No. 100-284, at 43; Johnson, supra note 2 1, at 161.
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Retardation.79 Here, the court found the Texas Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation's mandatory polygraph policy was overly
intrusive and constituted a violation of employees' privacy rights. °
While the court recognized that it was important for the Department to
maintain a safe environment for its patients, the court ultimately held
that it was more important to protect employees' right to privacy.8
Unfortunately, because state courts found support for their rulings in the
Constitution, many of these rulings did nothing to help private-sector
employees. 82
2. Congressional Action Moving Toward the Creation of the EPPA
Federal scrutiny of the private-sector's avid use and, in some cases,
83
abuse of the polygraph began in the mid-1960s with the 93rd Congress.
From the 93rd to 100th Congress when the EPPA was enacted, fifty bills
were introduced seeking to restrict, regulate, or ban the use of the
polygraph. 84 However, until the EPPA was passed in 1988, there was no
uniform federal legislation that protected private-sector employees from
unwarranted polygraph examinations, forcing citizens to rely on the
patch-work quilt of state polygraph laws. In 1986 during the 99th
Congress, Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Edward M. Kennedy introduced
S. 1815. 8 While the 99th Congress concluded before the Senate could
take action on the bill, 87 S. 1815 was tackled head on by the 100th
Congress. 88 Through its investigations, the Senate found a number of
abuses which provided justifications for the enactment of the EPPA.
The Senate found the disparity between state laws to be
disconcerting, especially since it was this lack of uniform standards that
79. 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987).
80. Id. at 205-06.
81. Id.
82. Neely, supranote 70, at 599.
83. Id. at 598.
84. Id.
85. S. REP. No. 100-284, pt. 3, at 44 (1988); Tiner, supra note 9, at 108. While uniform
federal regulation against polygraph examinations of all private-sector employees did not exist
before the enactment of the EPPA, some regulations were in place concerning the few private
employees who were involved in matters of national security. S. REP. No. 100-284, at 44. The
regulations that did exist were "extremely stringent," setting specific requirements for the
qualifications of examiners and the kinds of questions that could be used. Id. Most importantly,
these regulations prohibited the employer from compelling an employee to take a test and using the
employee's refusal as a firing justification. Id.
86. Tiner & O'Grady, supranote 10, at 107.
87. Id. at 108.
88. SeeS. REP.NO. 100-284.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss1/7

10

Barnhorn and Pegram: Speak the Truth and Tell No Lies: An Update for the Employee Poly

2011]

SPEAK THE TRUTH AND TELL NO LIES

was leading to abuses, often tacitly encouraging employers to
"circumvent state restrictions. ' , 89 For example, the Senate found that in
Washington, D.C., an employer is prohibited from asking his employee
to submit to a polygraph test. 90 However, if that employee was hired and
then transferred to a Virginia office, he could be let go there for refusing
to take a polygraph. 91 Furthermore, if the same employee was transferred
to a Maryland office, he would not be required to take a test, but he may
be subjected to questions that are prohibited in Virginia. 92 The Senate
found that the very purpose of these laws, to protect each state's citizens
how the state saw fit, was being sabotaged by this pervasive lack of
uniformity.93
The Senate also found that this lack of uniformity not only provided
loop-holes for employers, but also left employees "confused or ignorant
as to the rights they may enjoy in any given jurisdiction., 94 Citizens who
originally refused to take tests were being pigeonholed into taking tests
in other states, usually by being transferred to other offices, because they
did not know their rights under state law.95
Finally, the Senate found that employers were using the polygraphs
illegally. 96 In its investigation, the Senate discovered that on a number of
occasions, employers were using polygraphs to interrogate employees
97
about union activities, which in itself is a violation of federal labor law.
For these reasons, the Senate 98felt compelled to take action to restrict the
abusive use of the polygraph.
3. Opposition to the Law
Like many laws, the EPPA faced some opposition prior to its
passage. When the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
held hearings on the potential law, it found that a few senators, as well as
employers who used polygraphs in their workplaces, were opposed to

89. S.REP.No. 100-284, at43.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Id.
92. Id. While the aforementioned example may not be feasible in all parts of the United
States, the Senate found it disturbing that such radically different outcomes on the same subject of
law could be feasible within a ten mile radius. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 43-44.
95, See id. at 44.
96. Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 10, at 88.
97. Id.
98. See S. REP. No. 100-284.
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the passage of the law. 99

The Committee noted that employers put forth two "plausible
arguments" about how the polygraph could act as a positive force in the
workplace. l00 First, the employers argued that the possibility of being
subjected to a polygraph examination acted as a deterrent for an
employee considering bad acts such as stealing from his employer.
Second, the employers argued that a polygraph provided a tool for
innocent employees to "'clear' themselves of wrongful accusations."10' 1
The Committee understood these concerns, but determined that these
reasons were not enough to keep the use of the polygraph unrestrained,
especially because both uses would still be available to an employer
under certain provisions of the EPPA. 10 2 Under the ongoing
investigations exception, an employer would still be permitted to ask an
employee to submit to a polygraph examination when he had a
reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in a specific
incident of economic loss that the employer had suffered. 103 The
Committee pointed out that with this exception, the deterrent of the
polygraph was still present because there was not a total ban on its use in
himself with the
the workplace and that if an employee wished to 'clear'
104
so.
do
to
free
was
he
examination,
polygraph
a
of
use
Three senators on the Committee, Dan Quayle, Strom Thurmond,
and Thad Cochran, opposed the legislation, with two voicing their
opinions in the minority view section of the Committee's report.10 5
While Senator Quayle and Senator Thurmond wrote their own individual
opinions of the proposed EPPA, each had similar reasons for their
opposition to the legislation. First, the Senators viewed the legislation as
a federal intrusion on states' rights. 10 6 Senator Quayle was careful to
note that he opposed the bill not because he had any strong belief in the
accuracy of the polygraph, but because he felt the legislation created a
99.
100.
101.
102.

See S.REP. No. 100-284, at 46-47, 56-61.
Id.at 46.
Id.
Id. at 46-47.

103.

Id.;seeinfrapp. 102-162.

104. S.REP. No. 100-284, at 47. Even though the Committee noted that an employee could
'clear' himself with the use of a polygraph examination, it also warned employees of the possibility,
and even the likelihood, that the test could produce a false-positive. The Committee stated that the
rate at which polygraphs give false-positives is sufficiently high that it might even be prudent to
consider adding a clause to the legislation that prohibits employers from taking an adverse
employment action based solely on the polygraph results without some other corroborating evidence
of deception. Id.
105. Id. at 56, 58.
106. Id.
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federal intrusion into the employer's hiring and firing decisions, an area
scarcely regulated by the federal government except in matters of
discrimination. 0 7 Senator Thurmond expanded upon this, emphasizing
the importance of federalism and adding that he felt confident that this
was an area the states were best equipped to handle.'0 8 He believed the
states were capable of crafting legislation based on their individual
constituents' needs and that the passage of the EPPA "completely
undermines the solutions fashioned.., by the people of these and other
states.""1 9
Second, the Senators were concerned that this federal legislation
impinged on other ways to address the polygraph in the workplace,
namely collective bargaining.11 Both Senators felt that collective
bargaining could and already did address the use of the polygraph and
that the federal government had no place intruding on these collective
bargaining agreements.' 1 1 Finally, both Senators expressed concern that
the polygraph would be off-limits to the private sector, but could still be
employed by certain government agencies like the Federal Bureau of2
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency without restraint.'
Senator Quayle was opposed to this "double standard," stating "[f]or
them, the polygraph is reliable, but the very same device, in the hands of
the same polygrapher, is unreliable for other employers with less
important needs for screening . .

.

.Why is the polygraph reliable for

them, but not for Department of Transportation
contractors supplying
' 13
airport anti-terrorist and security services?"'
III. DIscussION OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT
The EPPA was enacted in 1988114 to rein in employers' use of
polygraphs." 5 The Act begins with a definitions section, 1 6 lays down a
general ban," 7 and proceeds to create multiple exemptions to the rule

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 56, 60.
See id. at 56-57, 60.
Id. at 57, 61.
Id.at 57.
29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 2001.
29 U.S.C. § 2002.
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against employers' use of lie detectors.11 8 Like much modem legislation,
the Act sets up procedures for enforcement and regulation. 19 The statute
creates specific rights for private citizens to bring civil litigation and for
the Secretary of Labor to assess fines for violations of the Act. 120 The list
of
of exemptions under the Act is long, but consists primarily 121
exemptions for the government and certain government contractors,
certain high profile industries, 122 and a limited exemption for private
employers known as the ongoing investigations exemption. 123 However,
to protect privacy rights, the statute strictly regulates usage of the results
even where an employer qualifies for an
of the lie detector examination
124
exemption under the Act.
A. General CongressionalBan on Polygraphsand Lie Detectors

Close scrutiny of the definitions the legislation utilizes is necessary
to understanding the ban created by the Act. The EPPA defines an
employer as any person who is acting in the employer's interest toward
an employee or even a prospective employee. 125 Employee, an undefined
term, was suggested by some courts to apply broadly because Congress
used the qualifier "any" in the statute. 126 The two key definitions of the
118. 29U.S.C. §2006 (2006).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2004 (2006). Specifically, the Act requires the Secretary of Labor to create
the necessary rules and regulations to enforce the statute, to cooperate with state and local
governments and agencies, employers, labor and employment organizations, and to investigate,
inspect, and require record keeping as needed to enforce the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2004(a).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(a)-(d) (2006). The Secretary of Labor has the authority to assess and
collect fines and has discretion over the amount of the fine based on past compliance and the
severity of the violation (up to a maximum of $10,000). 29 U.S.C. § 2005(a). The Secretary also has
the authority to seek injunctions against violators. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(b). The section also authorizes
federal courts to issue injunctions and to grant legal and equitable relief under the Act. Violating
employers can be liable to both employees and prospective employees for legal and equitable relief,
including reinstatement or lost wages and benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(c). It is important to note that
an employer could conceivably be liable financially to both the government and private litigants.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2005(a), (c).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a)-(c) (2006).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)-(f) (2006).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 2008 (2006).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(2) (2006). While the definition appears unambiguous, some appellate
courts have applied an "economic reality test" developed for the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Family and Medical Leave Act. See Watson v. Drummond Co., 436 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11 th Cir.
2006). This test focuses on the amount of control the individual or organization had over the
plaintiff and whose interests were advanced if a representative such as a union was involved. Id.
(theoretically, a union could be an employer if enough power is wielded over the company and the
union acted in the business' interest rather than the employees' interest).
126. Harmon v. CB Squared Servs. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470-71 (E.D.Va. 2009) (citing
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Act are for lie detectors and polygraphs. Both are defined rather broadly.
The statute defines lie detectors by listing several extant devices of the
era intended to be used to determine whether a person's statements are
honest. 127 The definition contemplates mechanical and electrical devices
used for the purpose of determining honesty. 128 To the extent that the
scope of devices is limited by the examples stated in the first half of the
definition, the statute would not cover new devices that rely primarily on
medical technologies, such as the fMRI. Polygraphs are defined simply
by the method of their operation - measuring "changes in
cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns" - and by their
purpose, which is to create a "diagnostic opinion" of the person's
statements. 129 Within these parameters, the Act sets up a general ban on
polygraph use.
1. The Ban on Lie Detectors as Set Down by Congress
The Act comprehensively bans an employer from any attempt to
solicit or require an employee to take a polygraph examination, unless
the employer specifically meets one of the exemptions enumerated in §
2006.130 Any employer engaged in commerce... cannot, either directly or
indirectly, "require, request, suggest, or cause any employee or
prospective employee to take ... a lie detector test." 132 The employer is
further prohibited from using, accepting, or inquiring about results of

29 U.S.C. § 2002()-(4) (2006)). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (the term employee is not defined
in the definitions section of the statute).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(3). The text of the statute states "[t]he term 'lie detector' includes a
polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar
device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the
purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual." Id.
128. Id. Regulations exclude from the definition of lie detectors medical tests that determine
the presence of alcohol or controlled substances in bodily fluids. 29 C.F.R. § 801.2(d)(2) (2011).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(4). The text provides:
The term "polygraph" means an instrument that-(A) records continuously, visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardiovascular,
respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and
(B) is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion
regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.

Id.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 2006 (2006).
131. In defining commerce, the EPPA refers the reader to 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). 29 U.S.C. §
2001(1) (2006). There, commerce is defined as "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof" 29
U.S.C. § 203(b) (2006).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1).
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any lie detector test of an employee or prospective employee. 133 Lastly,
an employer cannot threaten the employee with or take any negative
action against the employee or prospective employee for refusing to take
a lie detector test or based on the results of such a test.134 The Act further
bans employer action against employees who have complained, testified
(or plan to do so), or exercised the protections of the Act on behalf of
others. 135 The result of the ban is that an employer cannot force or even
encourage an employee to take a polygraph examination without
violating the Act. The use of results is an independent violation under
the Act.' 36

Congress wrote the ban to act only as a floor, not a ceiling. The Act
specifically states it will not preempt any state or local law or any
collective bargaining agreement that is more restrictive in its use of lie
detectors. 137 Therefore, employees or legislators could effectively ban
any and all use of lie detectors by employers without violating the statute
and without contravening legislative intent.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Ban on Lie Detectors
As with all legislation, courts developed a degree of nuance when
interpreting the statute. Certain portions of the statute have been
interpreted very strictly. For instance, even a mere request to complete a
lie detection test is a violation, regardless of whether the employee
consents or refuses. 38 Additionally, courts have clearly enforced as a
violation the provision against indirect suggestions to take a test, even
where the employee voluntarily consented. 139 In one case, the Fourth
Circuit held that merely alluding to the results was sufficient to violate §
2002(2). 140 Each violation of a sub-section under § 2002 by an employer

133. 29 U.S.C. § 2002(2).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 2002(3). The adverse employment actions barred by the Act are: being
discharged, disciplined, discriminated against, denied employment, or denied promotion. Id.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4).
136. See Harmon v. CB Squared Servs. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 459, 473 (E.D.Va. 2009);
Worden v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 549 F.3d 334, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2008).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (2006).
138. Watson v. Drummond Co., 436 F.3d 1310, 1313 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Polkey v.
Transtecs Corp., 404 F.3d 1264, 1268 (llth Cir. 2005)) (noting that the plain language of § 2002(1)
only requires an employer to request or suggest an employee take a polygraph test to be held liable).
See also Harmon, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
139. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1313 n.4.
140. Worden, 549 F.3d at 347 n.1 1 (defining "refer to" as alluding or directing attention to)
(citation omitted).
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is an independent violation not dependent on any other provision. 14 This
means a violation premised upon a request to take a lie detection test is
not dependent on whether the employer actually uses the results in any
employment decisions or vice versa. Certain interpretations are
grounded in common sense. For example, only requests from the
with the
employer can establish a violation. 142 Moreover, only a person
143
violation.
a
trigger
can
employee
the
terminate
to
authority
Other portions of the statute have been interpreted in a less
straightforward manner by the courts. For instance, the Fourth Circuit
has applied the mixed-motive test, developed in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,144 to determine if liability should apply under § 2002(3) for an
adverse employment action if the employer was going to terminate the
employee before the violation. 145 For a violation to occur, the adverse
employment action does not have to be the "sole" reason for the
decision. 146 However, the Price Waterhouse test provides that where a
mixed-motive exists, meaning the employer made a decision for both
legitimate and unlawful reasons, the employer can escape liability by
proving the decision would have been made solely upon legitimate
reasons. 147 Therefore, in Worden v. Suntrust Banks, the employer was
not found liable under § 2002(3), despite having knowledge of the
independent polygraph results, because it had independent justification
to terminate the employee and had acted similarly in the past where no
polygraph results were at issue. 148 This statutory analysis differs from
the plain text suggesting liability regardless of other reasons for the
employment decision.
B. Various Exemptions to the EPPA's GeneralBan
The EPPA lists six exemptions to the general ban set down by §
2002.149 None are as sweeping as the first exemption for governmental
entities. Section 2006 states that the EPPA is not applicable to the

141. Id. at 346.
142. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1314 (concluding that offers by the employer to administer a
polygraph test after a request to do so, either by the employee or his agent (i.e. union officials), do
not violate § 2002(1)).
143. See Warden, 549 F.3d at 343.
144. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
145. Id. at 341-43.
146. Id. at 341.
147. Id. at 341-42.
148. Id. at 342.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a)-(f) (2006).
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federal, state, or local government when acting as an employer. 5 °
Subsequent regulations interpreted this in a sweeping manner to include
all three branches of the government, civilian and military, and all
agencies and government corporations.1 51 The same regulation states the
though
exemption does not extend to any government contractors,
other exemptions do alter that pronouncement. 153 The legislation does
not change the status quo regarding government use of lie detectors on
its employees under this exemption.
The Act also creates a national defense and security exemption for
the federal government, "in the performance of any counterintelligence
function," to use a lie detector on any experts, consultants, or employees
of contractors for the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy when working with atomic energy activities. 154 The same section
also extends the exemption to any expert, consultant, or employee of
these contractors working for several intelligence-oriented agencies,
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 15 5 The exemption
extends to any applicants of these agencies as well as any person with
access to certain sensitive information and any experts, consultants, or
56
employees of these consultants with access to top-secret information.'
The Act grants the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a similar
exemption to use lie detectors on employees of its contractors when the
FBI is acting
"in the performance of any counterintelligence
157
function.'

Security services are exempt from the EPPA ban for certain
narrowly defined prospective employees. 158 For the exemption to apply,
the business must primarily provide "armored car personnel, personnel
engaged in the design, installation, and maintenance of security alarm
systems, or other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel ....,,9
Those personnel must additionally provide protection to "facilities,
materials, or operations having a significant impact on the health or
150. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a); 29 C.F.R. § 801.10 (2010). This sub-section also exempts political
subdivisions of state and local governments. Id.
151.
152.
153.

29 C.F.R. § 801.10.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(1)(A)-(B); 29 U.S.C. § 2006(c).

154. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(1)(A)-(B).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). The complete list of agencies is "the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, [and] the
Central Intelligence Agency." 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(2)(A)(i).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v)-(B).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(c).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1).
159.

Id.
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safety of any State or political subdivision ...or the national security of

the United States" as defined by the Secretary of Labor in rules and
regulations. 16 Protection of currency, proprietary information, and other

financial needs qualify under the Act. 16 1 Even if the company has some
prospective employees who do qualify, the exemption will not apply to

other prospective employees of the same company who do not fit this
narrow definition.1 62 The security services exemption is limited,
however, by the procedural

rules of § 2007(2) which state with

particularity how an examination should be given.1 63 The exemption can
also be further restricted under § 2009 if more restrictive state or local
laws, or collective bargaining agreements, exist.1 64
The EPPA sets up an exemption for companies "authorized to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance." 16' This

exemption, aptly titled the "Exemption for drug security, drug theft, or
drug diversion investigations,"

166

is applicable in two situations. First,

the manufacturer may require examination of prospective employees if
they will have "direct access" to controlled substances. 167 Second, the
exemption may apply to current employees, and operates similarly to the

ongoing investigation exemption. Current employees may be examined
during an ongoing investigation for criminal or other misconduct if the
conduct is related to a potential loss of drugs, and the employee actually
had access to the property under investigation. 168 The controlled
substances manufacturer exemption is limited identically to the security

services exemption, meaning it is subject to the procedural rules of §
2007(2)169 and additional restrictions under § 2009 for local legislation
and collective bargaining agreements. 170

160. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1)(A). The "facilities, materials and operations" contemplated by the
Act include facilities working with electric and nuclear power, public water utilities, handling of
radioactive or toxic waste materials, and public transportation. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(l)(A)(i)-(iv).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1)(B).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(2).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2007 (2006).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (2006).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(f)(1).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(t).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(t)(2)(A) (applies if prospective employees will have "direct access to
the manufacture, storage, distribution and sale of any such controlled substance").
168. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(f)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2007.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2009.
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C. OngoingInvestigation Exemptions
1. Ongoing Investigation Exemption for Private Employers
The ongoing investigation exemption, the focus of our proposed
changes below, is the only EPPA exemption available to private sector
employers.17 1 Private employers can qualify for this exemption only in
certain narrowly drawn situations and subject to very specific
regulations. 1 2 Three main conditions must be met, plus the employer
must provide written notification prior to actual administration of the
testing. 173 The first requirement is that the employer's investigation
involves an economic loss or injury to the business itself.174 According
to the statute, examples include "theft, embezzlement, misappropriation,
or . . . industrial espionage or sabotage."' 175 Additionally, the incident
must be related to a specific, known incident of loss and may not be an
attempt to uncover a suspected economic loss through random testing.1
Subsequent regulation has interpreted economic loss to extend beyond
direct losses like theft. Indirect losses, where an employee commits a
crime using his or her access to the business that induces a loss to the
employer, also satisfy this requirement. 7 7 Examples78 are money
laundering or use of employer vehicles to smuggle drugs. 1
The statute's second requirement lays down a pragmatic rule that
179
actually had an opportunity to cause the loss or injury.
employee
the
The EPPA subsection states the "employee had access to the property' 8°
that is the subject of the investigation."' 181 The term access applies not
just to a person who has access to the property in the literal sense, but
also anyone who has an ability to "aid or abet" the economic loss being
investigated. 8 2 The third requirement under the statute is reasonable
171. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d).
172. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d); 29 U.S.C. § 2007.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(1)-(4).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(1); 29 C.F.R. §801.12(c)(3) (2010).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(c)(1)(ii) (noting that the list is not exhaustive;
another pertinent example is misappropriation of trade secrets).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(b) (stating that an employer cannot engage in a "fishing expedition").
177. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(c)(l)(iii).
178. Id. (noting that the commission of a crime on premises alone without an economic loss to
the business does not satisfy this requirement).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(2).
180. Property is defined as tangible property but also as less tangible items of value, such as
security codes, electronic data, and trade secrets. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(e)(2).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(2).
182. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(e)(1). The regulation claims that a bookkeeper at a jewelry store who
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suspicion.' 83 This requires the employer to have an "observable,
articulable basis in fact" to believe the employee being investigated was
involved in the economic loss at issue. 8 4 Access, by itself, is insufficient
to prove reasonable suspicion. 85 Additional information, considered
under a totality of the circumstances approach, such as reports from coworkers, inconsistent statements, or unusual behavior, is required to
establish reasonable suspicion. 186 Determining whether87 reasonable
suspicion exists is a difficult and frequently litigated issue.1
The final requirement is a precisely described, written notice to the
employee, completed prior to the examination. 188 The statement must
describe the specific incident being investigated and the employer's
justification for testing that employee. 189 The notice has minimum
requirements that must mirror the first three requirements to qualify for
the exemption. It must state both the specific economic loss at issue in
the investigation1 90 and that the "employee had access to the
property."' 19' The employer's statement must disclose in detail the basis
192
for reasonable suspicion against the employee who will be examined.
The statute lastly requires the statement to be signed by an authorized
194
93
representative of the employer' and kept on file for three years.
Regulations have imposed some additional hoops to jump through
beyond those the statute requires. The employee must receive the written
notice required by the statute at least forty-eight hours prior the
examination. 195 Additionally, the date and time the statement is received,
including the employee's signature, is required to verify the forty-eighthour mandate. 196 Failure to satisfy any one of the numerous requirements
manages inventory records has "access" sufficient for the statute. Because the bookkeeper is
capable of aiding and abetting a theft by doctoring records, the bookkeeper has access. Id.
183. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(3).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(f)(1).
185. Id.
186. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(O(1)-(2). See also Mark G. Kisicki, Don't Do It! The Workplace and
PolygraphsJust Do Not Mix: The Employee Polygraph ProtectionAct, SR037 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1159,
1161 (2010).

187. Long v. Mango's Tropical Cafe, 958 F. Supp. 612, 616 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
188.

29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4).

189. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(A).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(D)(i).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(D)(ii).
192. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(D)(iii). See also 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(g)(3) (2010) (noting that the
particularity requirement is not satisfied by general assertions).
193. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(B).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d)(4)(C).
195. 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(g)(2).
196. Id.
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under this exemption - e.g. time frame for notice, providing written
notice, signature, or particularity requirements - invalidates use of the
ongoing investigation under the EPPA. 197 The employer would, through98
error, open the door to all the penalties allowed by the statute.
However, written notice detailing the employer's specific basis for
suspicion against the employee is not required by the statute unless the
test will actually be administered.' 99 The three other requirements under
§ 2006(d), access, reasonable suspicion, and that the investigation must
truly be ongoing, must be satisfied to validly request a lie detection
examination.200 The result is that the employer's request is protected
without the written notice but the examination is not valid unless the
written requirements are satisfied. Like the prior two exemptions, the
employee is further protected during the examination by limiting the
ongoing investigation exemption with the strict procedural rules of §
2007(b) that depict with particularity how to conduct the examination.20 '
The ongoing investigation exemption requirements, in addition to the
section 2007 procedural requirements, become so unwieldy for
employers to comply with that the American Law Institute ("ALI") has
published an article that "strongly discouraged" using lie detector
examinations in any circumstance, even if the employer's situation fits
within an exemption.202 Because of the complexities, the ALI report
clearly states that an employer should never go forward under the EPPA
without attorney guidance. 203
2. Restrictive Examination Procedures for the Ongoing Investigation
Exemption and Others
Section 2007 applies essentially only where private employers may
qualify to utilize lie detectors on an employee and never to the
government-agency exemptions.20 4 For instance, this section applies to
the ongoing investigation exemption which is available to any private
employer fitting its qualifications, as well as the exemption for security
197.

See id. § 801.12(h); see also Harmon v. CB Squared Servs., 624 F. Supp. 2d 459, 472

(E.D. Va. 2009).
198.

29 C.F.R. § 801.12(h).

199. Watson v. Drummond Co., 436 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that under §
2006(d)(4), notice is only required once the employee has accepted the request to be examined).
200. Id. at 1314.
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(h) (2010).
202. See Kisicki, supra note 186, at 1161.
203. Id.
204.

See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a).
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services and drug manufacturers.2 °5 Section 2007 sets up a series of
detailed procedures during the actual administration of the test if an
employee agrees, most of which are geared toward the employee's
rights.20 6 One such protection states that the ongoing investigation
exemption cannot be relied upon if the employer makes an adverse
or a refusal to take
employment decision based on lie detector test results
20 7
such test without "additional supporting evidence."
The statute splits the lie detector examination into four categories:
procedures to follow in all phases, prior to, during, and after the
08 The procedures are highly protective, often making the
examination. 20
hassle appear potentially fruitless to an employer. For instance, the
employee can terminate the examination at any point despite initial
consent and must be allowed to review all questions prior to the
20
examination. 09 Others procedures try to channel the examination toward
only relevant inquiries by banning questions that degrade, unnecessarily
intrude, or probe into personal topics, such as religious, political, or
sexual affiliations. 210 The pre-test phase, however, requires written
notice stating the details of the test itself, such as the time and location,
and the right to legal counsel before each test phase. 211 The employer's
written notice must further supply specific information about the
equipment to be used, the location, and certain rights of the examinee.2t 2
This written notice, containing certain rights for the employee, potential
uses of the examination, and legal rights and remedies of both the

205. See id. §§ 2006(d)-(f), 2007(b).
206. See id. § 2007.
207. Id. § 2007(a)(1) (defining an adverse employment decision as being "discharged,
disciplined, denied employment or promotion, or otherwise discriminated against"); 29 C.F.R. §
801.20(a) (2010). Use of an exemption is slightly more forgiving under the security services and
drug manufacturer exemptions than the ongoing investigation exemption. Compare 29 U.S.C. §
2007(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting an employer from taking an adverse employment action against an
employee or prospective employee if the results of a polygraph or refusal to take a polygraph are the
"sole basis" for the action under the security services and drug manufacturer exemptions) with §
2007(a)(1) (requiring an employer to provide "additional supporting evidence" for an adverse
employment action under the ongoing investigations exemption). Additional supporting evidence
under the statute includes access, evidence supporting the employer's claim for reasonable
suspicion, and "admissions or statements made by an employee," even during the examination. 29
C.F.R. § 801.20(b)()-(2).
208.

29 U.S.C. § 2007(b).

209. Id. § 2007(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(E). Beyond those enumerated in section 2007(b)(1), the statue
elicits only one requirement for the examination itself: the employer must restrict relevant questions
to those disclosed prior to the examination under section 2007(b)(2)(E). See id. § 2007(b)(3).
210.
211.
212.

Id. § 2007(b)(1)(B)-(C).
Id. § 2007(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2007(b)(2)(B)-(C).
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employer and employee under the EPPA, must be read to and signed by
the employee.2 13
The post-test phase of the examination requires several steps before
an employer can take an adverse employment action.214 One such
requirement obligates the employer to supply the employee with the test
results and a list of the questions used during the examination with their
respective lie detection responses. 215 An employer-employee meeting is
also required to discuss the results with the employee.2 16 Importantly, in
conformity with the science regarding accuracy of polygraph
211
examinations,217 the test may
not be any shorter than ninety minutes. 218
The statute also sets up several requirements of a valid test examiner and
safeguards for the manner in which the examiner must draw his or her
conclusions.2 19 It is clear that compliance with the numerous provisions
of § 2007 and identification of the appropriate exemption is
exceptionally difficult for an employer.22 ° When considering the
liabilities an employer faces both to employees and to the government,
employers are likely to find it more prudent to avoid the use of lie
detector examinations altogether.
3. Use of Polygraph Results When Employers Qualify for an Exemption
The Act strictly limits the potential dissemination of the results of a
lie detector test by any person other than the individual tested.221
Disclosure is limited to three basic entities.222 The examiner may
disclose the results to the examinee or his designated representative, the
employer and, if ordered to do so by a court, to any court, governmental
agency, arbitrator, or mediator.2 3 Employers are governed by identical
restrictions but may additionally disclose the lie detector results to the
proper governmental agency to the extent the results operate as "an
213. Id. § 2007(b)(2)(D).
214. Id. § 2007(b)(4).
215. Id. § 2007(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
216.

Id. § 2007(b)(4)(A).

217. See S. REP. No. 100-284, pt. 3, at 42-43 (1988) (stating the length of a polygraph
examination affects the accuracy of the results).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(5).
219. Id. § 2007(c).
220. Yvonne Koontz Sening, Note, Heads or Tails: The Employee Polygraph ProtectionAct,
39 CATH. U. L. REv. 235, 267-68 (1989) (concluding that despite the exemptions, the EPPA
essentially eliminates employers' right to utilize polygraph testing).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 2008.
222.

Id. § 2008(b).

223.

Id. § 2008(b)(l)-(3).
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admission of criminal conduct., 224 However, this sub-section does not
apply under the general governmental exemption, the national defense
and security exemption, or the FBI contractors' exemption. 22 Therefore,
under the exemptions, the Act limits the use of the examination results
by restricting who may access the results. Only the examinee, employer,
and a discrete number of government employees are permitted recipients
of the results.226
D. ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Public Employees
Public employers are generally exempt from the EPPA's ban on
polygraphs.2 27 Instead, public employers are subject to various
constitutional restrictions on their use of polygraphs in the employment
context. However, it is misguided to rely on these limitations as
sufficient to protect employees to the same degree as private sector
employees are protected by the EPPA. As discussed below, the
constitutional provisions, based on a variety of fact-specific
circumstances, do not protect many employees and prospective
employees.
The primary protection afforded to public sector employees is a
claim of constitutional personal privacy. The Texas Supreme Court
recognized this right when it found that its state constitution mimicked
the substance of the Federal Constitution's provisions.22 8 The court
relied on the "zones of privacy" analysis in familiar cases such as Roe v.
Wade229 and Griswold v. Connecticut2 30 to establish a state right to
privacy. 231 In this case, the Texas Department of Mental Health and
224. Id. § 2008(c)(1)-(2). The examiner can also disclose certain test data to another examiner
for assistance in analyzing the results if the identifying information is removed. 29 C.F.R. §
801.35(c) (2010). For decades prior to this legislation, courts have found polygraph tests,
specifically, to be inadmissible in courts as evidence. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923). Therefore, other than as a potential investigatory aid, the polygraph's role in a
criminal proceeding is unclear.
225. 29 U.S.C. § 2008(c).
226. Id. § 2008(b)-(c).
227. Id. § 2006(a); 29 C.F.R. § 801.10(a) (2010).
228. Tex. State Emps. Union v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987). The Texas standard is high, stating the "right to privacy should yield
only when the government can demonstrate that an intrusion is reasonably warranted for the

achievement of a compelling governmental objective that can be achieved by no less intrusive, more
reasonable means." Id.
229.

410 U.S. at 113, 152 (1972).

230.

381 U.S. at 479,485 (1965).

231.

Tex. State Emps. Union, 746 S.W.2d at 205. The "zones of privacy" theory states that

certain constitutional provisions that protect citizens also imply a degree of privacy in the sphere
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Mental Retardation implemented a mandatory polygraph policy in part
to investigate patient abuse and theft, and the policy was intended to ask
only questions tailored to the particular job and incident being
investigated.232 The Department, however, utilized various control
questions, which inquired deep into the personal lives of the employees,
and were irrelevant to the investigation but were used to determine the
truthfulness of relevant questions.233 To determine if the control
questions were a violation, the court balanced the state interest against
the employee's privacy, including the degree of the intrusion and its
reasonableness.23 4 While the court acknowledged the state's interest in
protecting patients, it found a violation of personal privacy because the
state's interests were not comparable to the safety interests that animate
exceptions for police and fire departments. 235 The Texas Supreme Court
also carved out exceptions to the constitutional right to privacy,
exposing public safety employees
to polygraph exams where other
236
public employees are exempt.

The constitutional right to privacy doctrine, with its lack of clear
procedures, has limitations that make results unpredictable. In Woodland
v. City of Houston,237 the City administered mandatory pre-employment
polygraph exams for positions in the fire department and airport police
division.13 8 The plaintiffs alleged they were asked highly intrusive
questions related to past drug use, sexual behavior, extramarital affairs,
and other personal matters. 239
related to the protected interest. See id.
232. Id.at204&n.1.
233. Id. at 204.
234. Id. at 205. The court noted that interests that are more closely aligned with state interests,
such as public safety, are stronger than typical employer-employee interests. Id.
235. Id. at 205-06 (noting that the state interest in public safety warrants deference to the
decisions of police and fire departments due to the unique circumstances of their jobs).
236. Id. at 206.
237. 940 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1991). The facts of the Woodland case are a practical example of
the unreliability of polygraphs. One of the plaintiffs, Goss, took five polygraph examinations,
resulting in one passage and four failures. Id. at 135-36. Of the four failures, Goss failed questions
based upon a theft once, sexual behavior once, drug use three times, and the date of his last
polygraph once. Id. at 136. This clearly illustrates the same examinee can yield differing results
within the same categories of questions, demonstrating an anecdotal inference of unreliability.
238. Id. at 135.
239. See id. at 136. When the polygraph examiner, a police officer, was asked if she had
administered tests with these types of intrusive questions, she readily answered yes. Id. at 136-37.
She admitted she asked one plaintiff about "the number of times that he had engaged in sexual
behavior outside his marriage, homosexual behavior, sexual behavior with animals, marijuana use at
any time, arrests of family members, and religion, but denied questioning him about the details of
his sexual relations with his wife or masturbation." Id. at 137. The examiner also admitted to asking
about extramarital affairs, stating "[tihat was a question that we ask all applicants." Id. (alteration in
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Courts have implied that a line exists where questions become
240
intrusive, but have been less than clear as to where to draw this line.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that using particular, limited, control
questions that are general in nature is not intrusive, despite being
"potentially embarrassing. 241 Questions may become problematic when
the topics include marriage, family, and sexual relations, which the court
"considered to be the most personal. 24 2 Ultimately, the court gave
weight to the City's public safety interest in preventing drug problems
among firefighters, which outweighed the intrusion of a general control
question. 243
Hester v. City of Milledgeville indicates that rather than an outright
ban on polygraph examinations of employees in the pre-employment
context, constitutional guarantees allow a certain degree of intrusive
questions to be asked of an employee.244 This is notable because it
demarcates a clear difference between public sector and private sector
employee protections. Private sector employees benefit from detailed
procedures mandated by the EPPA2 45 In fact, the EPPA mandates
specifically what questions may be asked of the examinee, offering
maximum protection to the employee.24 6 Public sector employees,
however,
are protected only by the degree of intrusion into their personal
7
lives.

24

Litigants have pressed constitutional arguments other than simply
the constitutional right to privacy. Employees who were denied
employment or terminated have claimed a Fourteenth Amendment
violation of due process on both property and liberty grounds with
varying degrees of success. Employees pursuing a procedural due
process claim face the stiff burden of establishing a property interest in
employment. The Third Circuit reaffirmed "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific

original). The Court did not resolve whether these questions were overly intrusive; rather, the case
was remanded for formal findings of fact by the judge. See id. at 139.
240. Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (1 th Cir. 1985).
241. Id. The Court found asking "whether [the firefighters] had ever done anything which, if
discovered, would have resulted in their dismissal or would have discredited the department" to be a

general question. Id
242. Id.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.2.

246. See 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2006). See also supra Part III.C.2.
247. See supra Part III.D.
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benefits.... He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."' 248 To claim a
property interest in employment, an employee must prove that an
entitlement to the employment is created under state law, or similar
authorities. 49 In Anderson, the plaintiffs were on a waiting list, but
because they were merely applicants, they had no entitlement to
employment and thus could not establish a property right.25 0 Further,
where employment decisions necessarily require discretionary choices
by management, such as promotion or remaining in the same position
indefinitely, the employee can prove neither entitlement nor a property
interest.251 However, where an employee may be terminated only for
cause, the employee can establish entitlement to continued employment
and thus can state a claim for procedural due process. 2
Most employees are at-will employees, meaning employers can fire
"an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. '253 If the
employment is at-will, the Supreme Court has found no property interest
can exist and therefore, that the employee cannot assert a due process
violation.2 5 4 In Bishop, the Court found that a policeman was at-will,
despite his classification as a permanent employee, because he could be
terminated if he did not perform the duties of his position adequately.2 55
The Court therefore found that no property interest was violated. 256 Even
if a property interest exists, the employee still must prove a deprivation
of his or her property interest. 7
A complaining employee's due process claim based on a liberty
interest is also unlikely to succeed. The standard sets up a multitude of
hurdles before an employee can prove a violation of due process. To
248. Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972)).
249. See id.; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
250. Anderson, 845 F.2d at 1220. But see Stana v.Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 126
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that an applicant to a public teaching position had an unusual property
interest in her rank on an eligibility list because the school district communicated its policy of
keeping candidates on the list for a particular time frame).
251. Anderson, 845 F.2dat 1221.
252. See id. (citing Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362, 366 (3d Cir. 1983)); Bishop, 426 U.S. at 345
n.8.
253. Witkowski v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 643 A.2d 546, 552 (N.J. 1994). See also Whirlpool
Corp. v. Vanderburgh Cnty.-Evansville Human Relations Comm'n, 875 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007); Cisco v. King, 205 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005).
254. See Bishop, 426 U.S. at 345, 347.
255. See id. at 344.
256. Id. at 347.
257. Perri,724 F.2d at 366. After determining if a property right exists under state law, courts
look to federal law to determine what procedure is due based on the competing interests. Id.
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successfully win a procedural due process claim premised on a liberty
interest, the employer must publicly disclose to a third party a "false and
defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his
termination. ' 258 Furthermore, the false statements must "seriously
damage his standing and associations in his community" or the false
statements must foreclose future employment opportunities in the
employee's desired field. 259 The touchstone is dissemination. Regardless
of the truth or falsity of the reason for termination, if the employer has
not disclosed the reasoning to another party, no liberty violation has
occurred.2 6 ° In Bishop, the Court stated that even if the charges were
false, there was no harm to the employee's reputation, as the manager
informed the employee of the charges in private.26 1
Damage to the employee's reputation or future employment must
not be simply trivial to sustain a liberty due process claim. 262 Courts
have recognized disclosed information to be sufficiently stigmatizing if
the claim includes charges of dishonesty and immorality, 263 "[w]here a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him., 264 An employer must also not
deprive the employee of future employment, but is not required to keep
the employee in an identical position or to promote him. 265 One court
found charges of sexual misconduct with a juvenile under the
supervision of a probation officer harmful enough to be "highly
stigmatizing and damaging to Morgan's good name, reputation, honor
and integrity., 266 However, failure to renew an untenured professor's

258. Id. at 367 (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977)).
259. See id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Morgan v. Tandy, No.
IP 99-535-C H/G, 2000 WL 682659, at *9-10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2000). See also Robb v. City of
Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Stigma to reputation alone, absent some
accompanying deprivation of present or future employment, is not a liberty interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment.").
260. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348. Plaintiffs must argue the disclosed statement is false to justify a
due process claim. See Morgan, 2000 WL 682659, at *10. If no dispute exists as to the truth of the
statement, additional process will not help the employee's claim. See id.
261. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348.
262. See Robb, 733 F.2d at 294 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573) (claim must be serious enough
to possibly harm standing in community or stigmatize).
263. Id.
264. Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362, 367 (3d Cir. 1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 408
U.S. at 573). But see Robb, 733 F.2d at 294 (noting that reputational harm is insufficient to prove a
liberty violation without the deprivation of current or future employment or a serious claim, such as
immorality).
265. See Robb, 733 F.2d at 294.
266. Morgan v. Tandy, No. IP 99-535-C H/G, 2000 WL 682659, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 28,
2000). Another court found termination of a probation department clerk-typist based on a drug-
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employment does not give rise to a liberty violation, even though it may
suggest poor performance to other potential employers.2 67 The Supreme
Court stated this result is appropriate any time an employee is terminated
without making the justification public.268
When an employee fails to recover for his or her claim of an equal
protection or substantive due process violation, he will likely also fail to
recover for the other claim. Courts have held employment-related equal
protection clause challenges ought to be analyzed under the rational
basis standard. 269 This standard requires the plaintiffs to show the law
"so lack[s] rationality that [it] constitute[s] a constitutionally
impermissible denial of equal protection., 270 The Supreme Court has
observed that a statute or regulation should be upheld against an equal
protection challenge "unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's
actions were irrational., 271 This standard requires a plaintiff to show
essentially that the action is irrational and no justification exists to
support the employer's process. 272 The run-of-the-mill case will
generally not meet this standard. Substantive due process claims have
been resolved without further analysis where an equal protection claim
fails based on the similar standards.27 3 Additionally, much like due
process claims, plaintiffs must also prove that some deprivation occurred
to establish a substantive due process claim.274

related criminal arrest, where charges were dismissed prior to termination, to be serious enough to
reverse summary judgment to determine whether the employer's justification was disseminated
publicly. Perri,724 F.2d at 363, 367-68.
267. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 575).
268. Id. at 348.
269. Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that the
rational basis standard is proper "where no fundamental right or suspect class is concerned") (citing
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
270. Id. at 1223 (citing Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 688 (3d. Cir. 1980)).
271. Id. (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
272. See Anderson, 845 F.2d at 1223.
273. See id. at 1225 (finding no basis to review a substantive due process claim where the
standard requires deference "unless it can have no rational, legitimate foundation") (citation
omitted).
274. See Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1984).
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IV. INTO A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF LIE DETECTION: THE USE OF FMRI
WHAT IS FMRI?
Most people are familiar with a traditional magnetic resonance
imaging device ("MRI"), either by undergoing a routine medical scan
themselves, hearing about it from relatives, or seeing it on television. A
traditional MRI uses noninvasive magnetism to produce images of what
is going on inside the body.275 When a health professional takes an MRI
of a person's brain, the machine first uses its magnet to align hydrogen
atoms within the brain, and then sends out a pulse of energy to disrupt
this alignment.276 When the atoms in the brain realign to the magnet,
they give off small bursts of energy.27 7 It is these bursts that are collected
and charted by the MRI device to give the examiner a picture of what's
lurking beneath the patient's skin.278
A functional magnetic resonance imaging device ("fMRI") uses the
same technology as a conventional MRI, but monitors fluctuations in
blood flow to various parts of the brain. 279 The same magnet used to
align atoms in a conventional MRI emits pulses that can pick up small
changes in a patient's blood oxygen levels through what is called the
blood-oxygen-level dependent ("BOLD") effect.28 ° These fluctuations in
blood flow to certain areas of the brain are indicators of increased
activity within that brain region. 211 Unlike a standard MRI, which
produces a static image, f1vIRI scans the brain for blood flow every two
to three seconds, allowing the machine to create a series of images that
can show changes in the levels of neural activity. 8 2 As one writer puts it,
this gives the examiner "a sort of cartography of cognition., 283 The

275. Corydon Ireland, Symposium: 'Will Brain Imaging Be Lie Detector Test of the Future?',
HARVARD GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2007, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/02/symposium-willbrain-imaging-be-lie-detector-test-of-the-future/.
276. Kittay, supra note 2, at 1357.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Id.; Ireland, supra note 275.
280. See Joseph Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be True?, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 492 (2008); Ireland, supra note 275. It is believed that active nerve
cells in the brain consume more oxygen, so when an fMRI detects blood with higher levels of
oxygen in a certain area of the brain, it is inferred that activity is occurring in that brain region. See

id.
281. Simpson, supra note 280, at 492. For example, if a certain area of the brain becomes
active, blood flow to that area will increase. Id.
282. Ireland, supra note 275.
283. Id.
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fMRI's brain activity maps are used in a number of specific areas of
medicine and are being-studied for use in others.284
A. JMRI as a Lie Detection Device
As early as 1999, some scientists fathomed that if a lie begins in the
brain, then perhaps an fMRI scan, which by its very purpose measures
activity within the brain, could detect when a person was lying.285 Now,
more than ten years later, the idea has taken off. A multitude of studies
have been conducted using the fMRI technology as a lie detector,286 and
on the heels of these studies, two companies, No Lie MR1287 and Cephos
Corporation, 288 have formed seeking to bring fMRI lie detection
technology into the legal mainstream for use in the courtroom,
employment screening, and any other area previously dominated by the
polygraph.2 89
The use of fMRI technology in lie detection relies on the idea that
the brain is hardwired to tell that truth.2 90 In order for a person to tell a
lie, he must overcome the brain's natural inclination to speak the
knowledge it knows and formulate a falsehood. 291 This requires
additional activity in more areas of the brain, which can be detected
through the BOLD effect by fMRI when newly-oxygenated blood enters
a certain region of the brain.292 Sometimes the areas of brain activity can
even double when a person is telling a lie.293 However, there is
somewhat of a disagreement among scientists as to which areas of the
brain are actually associated with lying and deception when activated.294
Studies have found that a variety of areas participate in lying, such as the

284. Simpson, supra note 280, at 492. More specifically, the fMRI readings are being used in
pre-surgical evaluations for patients with epilepsy and brain tumors. Id.
285. Ireland, supra note 275.
286. See Simpson, supra note 280, at 491. These studies put volunteers in a variety of
situations, including those that required telling spontaneous lies, rehearsed lies, pretending to have
an impaired memory, lying about stealing various items, lying about firing a gun, and various
versions of the Guilty Knowledge test. Id. at 492.
287. No LIE MRI, http://nolienri.com/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
288. The
Technology
Behind
Lie
Detection,
CEPHOS
CORPORATION,
http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-detection/index.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
289. Simpson, supranote 280, at 491. See Kittay, supranote 2, at 1352.
290. Kittay, supra note 2, at 1358.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 1359.
293. Id. In the study mentioned, seven areas of the brain were activated when the subject was
telling the truth and fourteen areas were activated while lying. Id.
294. Id. at 1358.
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and the medial
inferolateral cortex, 295 left middle temporal area, 296eda
frontal gyrus.297 While there is dispute about the exact areas, many
researchers agree that there is more activity in the prefrontal lobe and
anterior cingulated areas when a person is lying because these areas
generally control cognitive reasoning, and 298
are therefore "recruited for
the purpose of inhibiting... a true answer."
Administration of an fMRI lie detection test is similar to that of a
polygraph. Many of the same questioning techniques, such as the control
question method or the guilty-knowledge test, 299 used in polygraph
examinations are used with fMR. 30 0 However, unlike a polygraph,
questions are fed to the examinee via a computer screen and he responds
by clicking a button indicating either "yes" or "no. '30 ' One prominent
study30 2 had thirty subjects participate in a mock crime involving either a
ring or a watch.30 3 The subjects were paid fifty dollars for simply
participating, but were also told that if they could trick the lie detector,
they would receive fifty additional dollars.30 4 The researchers were able
to accurately determine whether the participant took the ring or the
watch in twenty-eight out of thirty cases, a 93% accuracy rate. 30 5 A
second group of thirty-one participants underwent the same scenario and
there the researchers accurately predicted twenty-eight out of thirty-one
cases, a 90% accuracy rate. 306 Another similar study conducted by other
researchers using the guilty-knowledge test reported an 86-90%
295. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast
Event-RelatedfMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) (noting that this area is key because

lying is a "memory-intense activity" and this brain area is involved in memory and responseselection).
296. Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception,
118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004). This study identified five regions of the brain in total
involved in lying: right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right orbitofrontal, right middle
frontal, and left middle temporal. Id.
297. See No LIE MRI, supranote 287.
298. Simpson, supra note 280, at 492.
299. See supra pp. 144-45.
300. See Simpson, supra note 280, at 493 (discussing a modified version of the guilty
knowledge test); Kittay, supra note 2, at 1359 (using, but not referring to by name, the control

question technique).
301. See Simpson, supranote 280, at 493; Kittay, supranote 2, at 1355.
302. Kittay, supra note 2, at 1366. This study was conducted by researchers working in
collaboration with Cephos Corporation. Id.
303. Simpson, supra note 280, at 493.
304. Id. In reality, all participants received $100 regardless of whether they could fool the
computer, but the researchers wanted to give the participants some incentive to lie. See id.
305. See Frank Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005).
306. See id.
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accuracy rate.3 °7
B. Advantages offMRI
Advocates of using fMRI in lie detection, such as No Lie MRI and
Cephos Corporation, cite many real advantages to using fMRI over a
polygraph. The first is that the nervousness of an examinee will likely
not affect the outcome of an exam.308 A nervous examinee may cause a
false positive on a polygraph, but this is less likely during an fMRI scan
since brain activity rather than heart rate is being measured. 30 9 A second
benefit is the tangible result of each test. A polygraph spits out a long
paper with various rows of scribbles that look like they came off a heart
monitor at a hospital, while an fMRI gives full-fledged pictures of the
examinee's brain and color codes the areas of the brain that are active,
making the result decipherable by almost anyone. 310 Finally, as
mentioned previously, an fMRI examination is, in essence, administered
by a computer. 3 1' This effectively eliminates the potential for an
examiner or an examinee to influence the results of the fMRI scan by
intimidating the other.31 2
C. Controversy in the Courtroom
The fMRI made its courtroom debut in late 2009, but not for the
purposes of lie detection.313 The defendant in that case, Brian Dugan,
pleaded guilty to murdering a woman and was facing the death
penalty.31 4 In his sentencing hearing, his lawyers put Kent Kiehl, a
neuroscientist from the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, on the
stand to testify about fMRI scans he administered to Dugan. 3 5 Kiehl
related to the court that Dugan's fMRIs showed he had mental
abnormalities associated with psychopathy, a mental illness, and because

307. Simpson, supra note 280, at 493.
308. Id.
309. See id. "The assumption is that even a trained counter-spy must use creativity and
calculation to formulate a new lie, and the most nervous Nellie will use memory to recount an event
in her past." Kittay, supra note 2, at 1355.
310. See Kittay, supra note 2, at 1355.
311. Id.
312. Seeid.
313. See Greg Miller, fMRI Evidence Used in Murder Sentencing, SCIENCE INSIDER (Nov. 23,
2009, 5:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/l 1/fnri-evidence-u.html.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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of this illness, Dugan should be spared from the death penalty.3 16
As a scientific tool of lie detection, the fMRI has not fared well in
the courtroom. In March 2009, defense counsel in a child sexual abuse
case in southern California sought to have fMRI scans performed by No
Lie MRI entered into evidence to show his client's innocence."' Only
one week later, the defense withdrew its petition to admit the scan, with
many speculating that it was withdrawn due to the number of expert
acquired to testify against the scientific
witnesses the prosecution had
318
technology.
the
of
soundness
The fMRI did not return to the courtroom until over a year later
when a plaintiff, Cynette Wilson, tried to use fMRI scans from Cephos
Corporation in a retaliation case against her employer.3 19 One of
Wilson's coworkers, Ronald Armstrong, was willing to testify as to the
retaliation and submitted to an fMRI examination to show his
truthfulness.32 0 The defendant, Corestaff Services, sought to preclude
Wilson's expert from testifying and Wilson pushed forward for a Frye
hearing before the court. 32' The court, however, only touched on the
scientific reliability in dicta, finding a different reason to exclude the

316. Id. Apparently the jury did not subscribe to what the defense was selling because they
sentenced Dugan to death after more than five hours of deliberation that spanned a two-day period.
Id.
317. Greg Miller, Truthiness? No Lie MRI Hits the Legal System, SCIENCE INSIDER (Mar. 17
2009,
3:24
PM),
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/03/tmthiness-no-l.html
[hereinafter Miller, Truthiness]. The scans found that the defendant was not lying when he denied
molesting the child. Id.
318. Letter from Gary C. Seisner, Attorney, to Henry Greely, Director, Center for Law and the
Biosciences,
Stanford
Law
School
(Mar.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2009/03/25/request-to-admit-no-lie-mri-report-incalifornia-case-is-withdrawn/. See Miller, Truthiness, supra note 317.
319. See Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (Sup.. Ct. 2010); Greg Miller,
fMRI Lie Detection HearingEnds, Decision Still to Come, SCIENCE INSIDER (May 14, 2010, 2:49
PM),
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/05/fmri-lie-detection-hearing-ends-.html
[hereinafter Miller, fMRI Lie Detection]. In this case, the plaintiff worked for a temporary staffing
agency, Corestaff Services. Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 640. She was placed at an investment banking
firm where she received an offensive, nude photograph from a coworker via fax. Id. She then filed a
sexual harassment complaint with both the bank and Corestaff. Id. After filing this complaint,
Wilson no longer received good assignments. Kelly Lowenberg, Breaking News: f(AM Lie
Detection Evidence Excluded in NY Court, STANFORD L. SCH. L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (May 5,
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2010/05/05/breaking-news-frnri-lie2010),
detection-evidence-excluded-in-ny-court-2/.
320. Wilson, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 640. Armstrong was willing to testify that he was told not to
place Wilson in work assignments because she filed a complaint. Id. To prove his truthfulness, he
submitted to an fMRI, which showed he was not lying. Id. Wilson then notified opposing counsel of
her intent to call an expert witness to testify to the truthfulness of Armstrong's statements. Id.
321. Id.
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expert witness: it impinged on the province of the jury. 322 The court
stated that the credibility of a witness is a collateral matter that has
323
"from the dawn of the common law" been a matter solely for the jury
and that expert testimony is only appropriate when it deals with
technical or professional knowledge "beyond the ken" of a typical
juror.32 4 While the court said a Frye hearing was unnecessary, it still
noted that even with a cursory view of the evidence presented, the
plaintiff would have been unable to show that fMRI is accepted as
reliable in the scientific community for the detection of deception.325
A week after the Wilson decision was handed down in New York,
Tennessee Magistrate Judge Tu Pham heard arguments and expert
testimony in a Daubert hearing about whether an fMRI scan could be
admitted in a criminal case involving a psychologist who was accused of
defrauding the Medicare system.326 On June 1, 2010 Judge Pham
327
deemed the fMRI scan inadmissible for the purpose of lie detection.
The court stated that fMRI was inadmissible under both the Daubert
standard and rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 The court
cited a number of areas where it felt fMRI was significantly lacking,
such as real-world research involving examinees who were facing
imprisonment for real crimes, support from the scientific community,
and proper scientific methodology. 329 Judge Pham also expressed special
concern about the testimony given by the defense's expert, Dr. Steven
Laken, founder of Cephos Corporation, as he could not say with
certainty whether Semrau was lying on any one specific question, but
just that Semrau was being "more overall" truthful. 330 The court was
unable to see how that kind of testimony would be able to aid a jury
322. Id. at 642.
323. Id. at 641 (citing People v. Williams, 159 N.E.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. 1959)).
324. Id. at 642.
325. Id.
326. See Miller, fMRI Lie Detection, supra note 319. The defendant, Lome Semau, the Chief
Executive Officer of two nursing homes, was accused of having employees fraudulently complete
Medicare and Medicaid forms, earning an extra three million dollars for his facilities. Alexis
Madrigal, Brain Scan Lie-Detection Deemed Farfrom Ready for Courtroom,WIRED (June 1, 2010,

3:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/06/fmri-lie-detection-in-court/. Semrau had
Cephos conduct fMRIs and was attempting to use those scans in court to show his innocence and
that he was acting in good faith when filing the forms. Id. Interestingly enough, Semrau originally
contracted to take two fMRls with Cephos and failed one of the two. Id. He took a third test with
Cephos, which he passed. Id.
327. See Madrigal, supra note 326.
328. Id. Rule 403 lets a judge exclude evidence if he feels its "probative value is substantially
outweighed" by the prejudice or confusion it may cause. FED. R. EVID. 403.
329. See Madrigal, supra note 326.
330. Id.
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deciding whether or not the defendant's testimony was reliable and
credible. 331 After Judge Pham's decision, the prospects for the admission
of fMRI in court regarding a witness's credibility do not look bright.
V.

PROPOSALS TO UPDATE AND IMPROVE THE

EPPA

A. ConstitutionalProtectionsAre Insufficient to Adequately Protect
Employees
Constitutional personal privacy has notable limitations that fall
short of the procedural protections afforded by the EPPA. First, the test
applied by courts fails to be an effective predictor of which exam
questions are acceptable. The test requires balancing the employee's
privacy against the government's interest, while weighing more heavily
toward government employers whose mission relates to public safety.332
While the test considers intrusiveness and reasonableness,333 it does not
provide guidance or indicate clear criteria to the employer about whether
a question goes too far. Courts allow "potentially embarrassing"
questions if they are general in nature. 334 If the government interest is
strong, the employee may be required to answer questions about
personal topics. 335 The EPPA, however, is far more clear about which
questions may be asked during an exam. For instance, employers can
never ask questions about religion, political matters, or sexual
behavior.3 36 This protection is not a matter of balancing, but of right.337
Public sector employees are undeniably less protected than private sector
employees from intrusions and embarrassment because of these EPPA
restrictions. The fact-specific nature of the balancing test is incapable of
ensuring predictable exam restrictions.
Due process claims do little to advance an employee's privacy from
intrusion. Even where an employee establishes a violation of a property
or liberty right under the Fourteenth Amendment, he is only entitled to
notice and a hearing to explain lack of wrongdoing accused in the
charges. 338 Additional process, however, does not deter an employer
331.

Id.

332.

See supra Part 1II.D.

333. See supra Part III.D.
334. See supra Part III.D. (citing Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11 th
Cir. 1985)).
335. See supra Part III.D.
336. 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(1)(C) (2006). See supra Part III.D.
337. See 29 U.S.C. § 2007(b)(1)(C).
338. Morgan v. Tandy, No. IP 99-535-C H/G, 2000 WL 682659, at *11, *14 (S.D. Ind. Feb.
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from utilizing a lie detector or from firing an employee. An employer
must only give notice of the reason for the termination and allow the
employee an opportunity to be heard prior to the termination. 339 Neither
notice nor an opportunity to be heard restricts an employer's ability to
use a lie detector because these safeguards only apply after the employer
decides to take adverse action against the employee. If the employer
completes this minimal hearing requirement, due process will be
satisfied. 4 ° Such a minor requirement is insufficient to protect
employees from unnecessary lie detector tests, and cannot adequately
influence an employer's decision to give a lie detector test.
Additionally, the procedures afforded under due process claims are
less stringent than those of the EPPA. To satisfy due process, an
employee is only entitled to notice and a hearing to defend the
allegations. 341 The EPPA provides more comprehensive procedures,
including the manner in which the exam may be conducted, who may
administer the exams, and even under what circumstances an exam may
be requested.342
Furthermore, the procedures guaranteed under the ongoing
investigation exemption are concrete and restrictive. 343 For instance, the
employer cannot fire an employee on the basis of a failed lie detector
test alone; rather, it must have something more.344 Due process does not
have a similar restriction.345 As a result, private sector employees have
greater procedural protections than public sector employees. Applying
the ongoing investigation exemption to all employers would afford all
employees equal procedural protections under the EPPA.
Equal protection claims do not afford employees much assistance
due to the high burden a plaintiff must establish to succeed. Anderson v.
City of Philadelphia346 is an apt example. In Anderson, the court upheld
the use of polygraphs on applicants for police and prison correctional
officer positions because the plaintiffs were not able to prove that the

28, 2000) (noting a public employee is "entitled to a hearing and an opportunity to clear his name
before a private accusation becomes public"). See Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362, 366-67 (3d Cir.
1983) (noting some form of hearing and notice of the reason for dismissal are required before
depriving an employee of a property interest in employment).
339. See Morgan, 2000 WL 682659, at *17.
340.

See id. at * 11, * 17; Perri, 724 F.2d at 366-67.

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Morgan, 2000 WL 682659, at *11, *17.
See supraPart II.C.2.
See supraPart IlI.C.2.
See supraPart I.C.2.
See supraPart I1D.
845 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1988).
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polygraph could "not reasonably be believed to produce" better
employees than without using a polygraph.347 The court reasoned the
expert witness' testimony, which stated that a lack of scientific evidence
existed to prove the validity of polygraph testing, did not support the
argument that polygraphs are irrational to use, as the polygraph's results
distinguish truth "with an accuracy greater than chance. 3 48 The court
was unconcerned that qualified applicants might be excluded in error
because the equal protection clause only requires the new hires be a
more qualified group than a group that did not use the polygraph. 349 The
court noted polygraphs had a secondary effect of intimidating employees
into completing honest applications, eliciting presumably more reliable
information about an applicant. 350 Since no equal protection violation
occurred, the court allowed law enforcement administration to decide
whether polygraphs are appropriate to use.351 This case illustrates the
difficulty of satisfying an equal protection claim against an employer.
The employee must effectively prove no rational basis exists for an
employer's action. Here, the court did not consider the potential
inaccuracies of the polygraph. As a result, protection from lie detectors
is unlikely to stem from this ground.
B. Applying the Ongoing InvestigationExemption to All Employers
Createsa Uniform Safe Havenfor Employees While Affording
Employers the Latitude to Act when Necessary
The ongoing investigation exemption under the EPPA offers the
best solution to protect all employees from intrusive and unreliable
testing regarding employment during most typical situations while still
allowing employers to complete an investigation with the aid of a lie
detector for legitimate concerns if the employer chooses. Because the
EPPA only allows investigations for certain thefts, and the lie detection
results cannot be the sole basis for a termination, employers have
appropriate, limited access to the devices.35 2 Constitutional provisions
provide varying results based on fact-dependent situations.353 The EPPA
includes more specific restrictions and provides more uniform

347.

See id.at 1223.

348.
349.
350.
351.

See id.
See id.
at1223-24.
See id.
at1224.
Id.at1225.

352.
353.

See supra Part III.C.
1.
See supra Part III.D.
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procedures for personnel subjected to an exam.354 In order to equalize
the protections afforded to private and public sector employees, the
EPPA should be revised to limit both private and government employers
to solely the ongoing investigation exemption, with only a few
exceptions discussed in the next section.
Imposing the ongoing investigation exemption on all employers
universally will have the benefit of uniformity. Under the current law,
public sector employees' employment is governed by differing state
laws that affect different constitutional protections. For instance, certain
Pennsylvania judicial employees and civil service employees have a
colorable due process claim under the state regulations while employees
in Indiana have no basis to complain under their at-will system.355
Adopting the EPPA universally applies a uniform standard on all
working Americans, leading to predictability and greater employee
protections. Employees in neighboring states should not harbor differing
risks regarding lie detector examinations.
Most importantly, applying the EPPA uniformly against all
employers will create equal privacy protection among all employees,
rather than two differently treated classes. The ongoing investigation
exemption should be extended to all employers as a matter of fairness to
employees. Under the current law, an individual's choice of employer public or private sector - determines the degree of privacy protection
available.356 The decision to pursue a government job rather than a
position with a private employer should not determine an individual's
exposure to invasive intrusions during lie detection exams.
Consequently, applying the EPPA to all employers will foster equal
treatment for all employees, not just some employees.

354. See supra Part lII.C.2.
355. Compare Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362, 366 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a clerk-typist had
a property interest in continued employment during her probationary period because her
employment during first six months could be terminated only for just cause), and Robb v. City of
Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that a property interest in continued
employment exists where Pennsylvania State regulations bar removal or demotion of civil servants
without just cause), with Morgan v. Tandy, No. IP 99-535-C H/G, 2000 WL 682659, at *8 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 28, 2000) (noting that no property interest in employment exists for at-will employees
under Indiana law).
356. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1) (2006) (stating that an employer engaged in commerce
cannot solicit or require a prospective employee to take a lie detector test), with 29 U.S.C. § 2006(a)
(2006) (stating that public employers are generally exempt from the ban on polygraphs under the
EPPA).
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C. Exemptionsfor Key Government Agencies
While this note proposes eliminating most public sector exemptions
from the EPPA, retaining certain exemptions is justified due to a
compelling government interest. Sectors of the government such as the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI"), the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), and the Department
of Defense are among the agencies that should qualify for exemptions
under the EPPA. All of these agencies deal with matters of national
security and public safety on a daily basis.357 Because public safety is a
high-priority issue, there is a substantial and compelling government
interest for these organizations to have access to lie detection devices for
their staff. Although this may impose an intrusion upon employees'
privacy, their privacy has to be balanced with protecting the safety of
citizens. In light of the duties and responsibilities of these agencies,
such an exemption under the EPPA is warranted.
In addition to the government interests, political realities must also
be considered. Issues of public safety, national security, and military
safety are hotly debated topics in Congress that few representatives on
either side of the aisle would be enthusiastic to curtail. In light of this,
our proposal recognizes a second justification for retaining exemptions
for these agencies - a lack of political will. Political support for these
agencies has grown in the era after September 11, 2001 due to a
heightened focus on risks to public safety." 8 This additional support
further complicates any legislative action that would eliminate access to
an investigative tool, regardless of whether the tool is of dubious
accuracy. Due to the political climate, sweeping legislation prohibiting
the use of lie detection devices would be unrealistic and unachievable at
this time.
D. Addition offMRI to the EPPA
As of 2007, approximately forty thousand polygraph examinations
357. The controlled substances manufacturer exemption cannot be justified by an interest of
similar magnitude to public safety. Furthermore, if the drug manufacturer suffers from repetitive
thefts, it could use the ongoing investigation exemption to investigate the thefts. Accordingly, our
proposal includes abolishing EPPA § 2006(f), which would place drug manufacturers in the same
position as all employers.
358. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? American
JurisprudenceConfronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) ("Among the dozens of
bills rapidly passed in the wake of September It was the 'USA PATRIOT Act,' which gives
intelligence and law enforcement agencies dramatically expanded surveillance powers").
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were still being administered annually. 359 Regardless of whether this is
legislation banning the use of polygraphs in the workplace, the human
desire to find the truth is persistent and continues to find new ways to
manifest itself. One of these ways is the use of fMRI, a medical
diagnostic tool normally used in pre-surgical analysis, as a lie detection
device. In order to keep employees protected, the EPPA, as well as its
accompanying regulations, need to be updated both to include fMRI and
to clarify that any other device or process that is normally used as a
medical tool cannot be manipulated and used as a lie detector. Section
2001(3) of the EPPA currently defines a lie detector as "a polygraph,
deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or
any other similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used,
or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic
opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.,, 360 This
section should be amended to define a lie detector as:
a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress
evaluator, functional magnetic resonance imaging (/MRI) scan, or any

other machine, process, technology, or similar device, including

medical technology, that is used, or the results of which are used, for
the purpose of rendering a 36
diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or
dishonesty of an individual. t
The corresponding regulation that defines a lie detector currently
reads "[t]he term lie detector means a polygraph, deceptograph, voice
stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar
device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of
which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion
regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual. 362 This regulation
should be changed to read:
The term lie detector means a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress
analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (7vIRI), or any other machine, process, technology,
or similar device, including medical technology, that is used, or the
results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic

359.
360.
361.
362.

Ireland, supra note 275.
29 U.S.C. § 2001(3) (2006).
Phrases in italics indicate proposed changes to the legislation.
29 C.F.R. § 801.2(d)(1) (2010).
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363
opinion regarding honesty or dishonesty of an individual.

Finally, one portion of the corresponding regulations notes that a
drug or alcohol test does not constitute a form of lie detection. 364 This
section currently reads "[t]he term lie detector does not include medical
tests used to determine the presence or absence of controlled substances
'
A line should be added to this regulation
or alcohol in bodily fluids."365
to remind employers that this is not a prohibition against all medical
tests. The regulation should be amended to read:
The term lie detector does not include medical tests used to determine
the presence or absences of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily
fluids. This should not be construed to include other medical
technology, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
which is being used in a manner consistent with the definition of a lie
detector stated in § 801.2(d)(1).366

While fMRI may not yet be as infamous as the polygraph, it is
crucial that this emerging form of lie detection be added to the EPPA for
two reasons: its lack of scientific reliability, and its burgeoning use and
availability in the employment sector. There are many problems in
fMRI's scientific foundation as a lie detection device. 367 First, the rockbottom assumption, that either more or different areas of the brain are
activated when a person is lying, is itself just a guess.368 In the same way
a polygraph physiologically reads changes in respiration, fMRI
physiologically reads changes in blood flow in the brain. 369 A person
reviewing an fMRI scan can determine the amount of an examinee's
brain activity, but activity is only an indirect inference of neuronal
activity, which may not be task-specific. 370 Making the connection
between brain activity and a lie is a leap that could easily lead to falsepositives. 37 As one author puts it, this connection between brain activity
and deception is an "[i]f-and it is a huge if...
Second, the research that has been done on the use of fMRI as a lie
363.
364.
365.
366.
367,
368.
369.

Phrases in italics indicate proposed changes to the legislation.
29 C.F.R. § 801.2(d)(2).
Id.
Phrases in italics indicate proposed changes to the legislation.
See discussion suprap. 176,
See discussion suprap. 172.
See discussion suprapp. 171-173.

370.

Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-BasedLie Detection: The Urgent Need for

Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 382-83 (2007).

371. See id. at 383.
372. Schauer, supra note 3, at 1197.
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detection device is significantly lacking. There are a number of factors
that the current research has not taken into consideration, which equates
to limitations of the technique in general. Up until this point, testing has
been conducted on healthy adults.373 There has been no testing on
juveniles or the elderly. 74 There has been no testing on individuals with
mental disorders such as schizophrenia, dementia, or anti-social
personality disorder. 375 There has been no testing on individuals who
were born with birth defects, suffer from mental retardation, or have
sustained serious head injuries.376 Because all of these conditions have or
may have some effect on a person's brain, it is uncertain if they would
alter the results of an fMRI scan.377 For example, individuals with
antisocial personality disorder frequently exhibit hyporesponsivity,
which may allow them to fool a polygraph. 378 It is uncertain if they

would have this same advantage over fMRI, especially if the individual
believes his own lies. In the same vein, a person with dementia may be
delusional, allowing him to pass an fMRI test because he truly believes
he is telling the truth, even though his version of the truth is not what
actually occurred.379
Third, critics of current fMRI research also note that all test
subjects have been instructed to lie, which may show up differently on
an fMRI scan than "real-world lying," where an individual may have his
freedom, job, or livelihood at risk.38 ° Some researchers point out that
while we may currently be able to detect liars in an experimental setting,
there is no guarantee that this will work in the real world. 381 This
skepticism is not without basis. Hank Greely, a Stanford Law professor
and co-director of the Law and Neuroscience Project, pointed out that in
one of the only cases involving the "real world" use of an fMRI as a lie
detection device, the accuracy rate was either 33.3% or 66.7%.382

373. Simpson, supranote 280, at 493.
374. Id.
375.
376.
377.

See id.
See id.
Id.

378. Id. at 493-94.
379. See id.
380. See Greely & Illes, supra note 370 at 404; Schauer, supranote 3, at 1201; Simpson, supra
note 280, at 494.
381. Schauer, supranote 3, at 1201.
382. See Madrigal, supra note 326. In this case before a Tennessee magistrate judge, Cephos
conducted an fMRI scan on a nursing home owner, Semrau, accused of Medicare and Medicaid
fraud. Id. At first, Semrau took two tests, failing one and passing another. Id. Cephos tested Semrau
a third time, claiming he had been "tired" during the first two tests. Id. Semrau passed the third test.
See id.
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A related criticism is the lack of research on countermeasures an
examinee could take to fool the fMRI test.383 One countermeasure
considered is the possibility of an examinee that has extensively
rehearsed the story he will be telling.384 One study has already shown
that there are different brain activation patterns in a person that is telling
a spontaneous lie versus a rehearsed lie.385 In that study, the story had
been rehearsed for only a few minutes, but no testing has been
conducted on an individual that has been instructed to take on a false
identity such as an undercover police officer or CIA agent.386 Simpler
countermeasures may also be available for a person who wants to trick
the fMRI scanner. Even the smallest actions by the examinee, such as
jaw clenching or tongue movements, are capable of rendering the fMRI
scan completely useless.

38 7

Some studies have found that as little as

three millimeters of movement will cause a blurring on the scan.3 88 In
some cases, movement may not even be necessary to distort an fMRI
reading -just thinking about another task or doing simple arithmetic can
"muddy the underlying picture. 389
Finally, what little research has been done may not be scientifically
reliable. The people who tout the accuracy and reliability of fMRI are
not unbiased scientific researchers, but for-profit companies.3 9 ° Many of
the experiments that have found high levels of accuracy for fMRI are led
by researchers who are on the boards, are scientific advisors for, or are
the holders of patents used by companies such as No Lie MRI or Cephos
Corporation.3 91 Furthermore, many of the studies conducted in
conjunction with No Lie MRI and Cephos have neither been replicated
by other researchers nor been published in peer-reviewed journals, both
of which constitute important steps on the path to scientific validity and
S1 392
recognition.
Therefore, it is no shock that fMRI was not able to meet a Frye or
Daubert standard in court. 393 If a court of law does not recognize this
383. See GEORGE W. MASCHKE & GINO J. SCALABRINI, THE LIE BEHIND THE LIE DETECTOR
156-57 (4th ed. 2005), available at http://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf.
384. See Simpson, supra note 280, at 494.
385.

Id.

386.
387.

See id.
Greely & Illes, supra note 370, at 404.

388.

Ireland, supra note 275.

389.
390.
391.
392.

Greely & Illes, supra note 370, at 405.
Schauer, supranote 3, at 1202.
See id.at 1202 n.53.
See id.at 1201-02.

393.

See Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Madrigal,

supra note 326.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

45

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7

186

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:141

procedure as scientifically accurate and accepted in the scientific
community, then employees should not be forced to submit to the
procedure. One of the underlying reasons for the implementation of the
EPPA was that employees were either being denied employment or fired
based on an inaccurate device.39 4 The state of the research surrounding
fMRI currently parallels the concerns surrounding the polygraph at the
EPPA's implementation. This is a device that employees need to be
protected from, at the very least, until further research has been
conducted.
Regardless of whether or not a polygraph can detect deception,
many people think it does. 395 This belief can be very powerful,
compelling a person to submit to a polygraph he never wanted to take in
the first place or making him say things he normally would have kept to
himself.396 This same issue is present with fMRI, if not more so. Most
employees probably have little to no knowledge about fMRI. However,
they probably have, at some point, had an MRI, known someone who
has had an MRI, or heard of an MRI. They are also likely familiar with a
polygraph or a lie detector. When a person then hears that an MRJ,
which they know to be a reliable medical device, can now actually scan
your brain and detect lies, that person may feel he has no choice but to
submit to such a test. Besides feeling compelled, the employee also does
not know he is being misled - he may have absolutely no clue that fMRI
has not been scientifically proven to accurately detect deception and that
the research supporting it is scanty and skewed. What he may have
heard, though, is that two corporations now touting fMRI as a
scientifically sound lie detector are attempting to sell their wares and
gain common acceptance and usage in the court room. These
corporations have compelling websites with research studies supporting
them.39 7 This only adds to the employee being led down a path he never
wanted to walk in the first place. Employees need to be protected from
this whirlwind and the best way to do that is to add fMRI to the EPPA.
VI. CONCLUSION

While scientists and inventors have tried many ways to unravel the
mystery of a lie, today we are no closer to having a fool-proof method of
394.
395.
396.
397.
287.

See 134 CONG. REC. S7503 (daily ed. June 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
Eggen & Vedantam, supranote 56.
Id.
See e.g., The Technology Behind Lie Detection, supra note 288; No LIE MRI, supra note
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lie detection than when the first polygraph was conceived over I 10 years
ago. People's belief in the accuracy of lie detectors is misplaced, which
is the reason that the use of purported lie detection devices should be
limited only to dire situations.
Under the EPPA as it is now, public and private sector employees
are treated differently, leading to disparate levels of protection. 398 In
order to ensure equal treatment of these two classes, the public sector
exemption needs to be abolished. Generally, all employers should be
confined to using a polygraph only in the most serious of circumstances,
such as during the investigation of a specific theft or loss.
As technology evolves, the law must adapt. With traditional
medical practices, such as MRI, now being manipulated to function as
lie detection devices, the EPPA must be updated to make sure these new
technologies do not evade the will of Congress. The amendments and
modifications proposed by this note will resolve the weaknesses inherent
in the EPPA as well as modernize the law to combat new and unforeseen
technologies that endanger employees' rights.
DavidBarnhorn and Joey E. Pegram*
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